An agent reads untrusted web content and tool output. How do you defend against prompt injection?
Any content an agent reads can smuggle in instructions that hijack it. The signal is knowing why filtering can't fully solve injection and which containment controls actually bound the damage when it succeeds.
Updated Sep 2026 · Grounded in real GenAI, LLM, and AI/ML engineering interview loops and written to a senior-engineer editorial bar.
Any content an agent reads can smuggle in instructions that hijack it. The signal is knowing why filtering can't fully solve injection and which containment controls actually bound the damage when it succeeds.
Lead with where the obvious approach breaks, because that is the judgment they are screening for — most candidates jump straight to the happy path and lose the room.
Then walk the failure back through the pipeline in order, naming the one metric the customer's exec sponsor actually cares about before you propose the fix.
